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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CELESTE BOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No.
11266

vs.

MARY TURNER BOTT,

)

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This matter arises out of an action for divorce involving events arising subsequent to the rendition of the
Decree of Divorce, whereby plaintiff was granted a Decree of Divorce from defendant, and defendant was
awarded a Decree of Divorce from plaintiff on her
counterclaim.
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
This is an appeal from a judgment and order holding the appellant in contempt of court for failure to
comply with the Decree of Divorce, and further restraining plaintiff from maintaining a separate cause of
action against defendant for adjudication or personal
property rights in and to certain personal property that
plaintiff claims defendant removed from his dwelling
house.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court's
order dated May 2, 1968, on the grounds that the court,
in holding the plaintiff in contempt thereof, violated
plaintiff's constitutional rights, and the court in its entering a restraining order restraining plaintiff from
pursuing his cause of action against defendant did so
contrary to law.

FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were divorced in July of
1966; and at the time of the rendition of the Decree of
Divorce, the defendant was awarded in lieu of alimony
the sum of $2,400.00 payable at the rate of $200.00 per
month for one year without interest. (R-28)
In addition thereto, defendant was awarded certain
items of personal property, which by a further memoran·
dum decision rendered by the Court on September 23,
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1966, additional personal property was given to the

defendant. ( R-32, 33)

Thereafter, the defendant removed herself from
the dwelling house that had been awarded to the plaintiff, but according to the allegations of plaintiff removed personal property not awarded to her, having a
value in exce.ss of $2,000.00. (R-99)
The plaintiff, by reason of defendant's conduct, refused to pay the balance of the $2,400.00 called for in
the original Decree of Divorce, claiming an offset for
the property removed by defendant. (R-99, 100) Subsequently, the defendant caused an order to show cause
to be issued ordering the plaintiff to appear and show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court
for his failure to pay the judgment. This matter was
the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah,
Case No. 10992, the decision of the Supreme Court being
rendered on February 19, 1968. (R-73)
At the time of the hearing on the order to show
cause, the court went into matters not plead pursuant to
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, but did adjudicate the
property rights of the plaintiff in and to certain personal
property which he claimed defendant had removed from
the dwelling house. In addition thereto, the court held
that the plaintiff was in contempt of court and ordered
him to serve five days in the County Jail.
The court, in its decision, held that even though
there was only three days notice to the plaintiff, and
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even though there had been no written pleadings filed,
the matter with regard to the adjudication of the property rights was properly before the court; but the court
did rule that because no affidavit had been filed with
regards to the alleged contempt, the court had improperly held the plaintiff to be in contempt of court.
Following the rendition of the Supreme Court's
decision, the defendant filed an affidavit in compliance
with the Utah statute, and proceeded to a new adjudication as to whether or not the plaintiff was in contempt
of court. The court found that he was, and ordered him
to serve fifteen days in the County Jail. (R-120)
In addition thereto, the court entered a restraining
order restraining plaintiff from continuing an independent action filed by plaintiff against the defendant
to adjudicate property rights in certain personal property that plaintiff claims defendant has. The property
rights are not the same as those adjudicated by the court
previously. (R-113)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED IN HOLDING
HIM IN CONTEMPT OF COURT FOR HIS
FAILURE TO PAY A MONEY JUDGMENT.
Under the original Decree of Divorce, the appel·
lant wa.s ordered to pay to the respondent a money
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judgment of $2,400.00. (R-28) The appellant's refusal to pay this money judgment may not be punished
by contempt of court in that the Constitution of Utah
specifically holds that there shall be no imprisonment
for debt. Article I, Section 16, Constitution of Utah.
Imprisonment for debt, while popular in the early
colonial days of our country, fell into disuse hundreds
of years ago, and the various states of the Union, in
enacting their constitutions, expressly prohibited imprisonment for debt. In speaking of the subject, 16
Am J ur 2nd, 723, Constitutional Law, Section 386,
observed:
"In a few other states, the constitution forbids
imprisonment for debt, except in cases of absconding debtors. Such a prohibition is broad
and sweeping, and no limitations should be read
into it except that exception which actually exists,
inserted by the makers of the constitution themselves in accordance with their expre~sed intention." (citing cases)
The provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 16, reads:
"There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in cases of absconding debtors."

It is obvious from the reading of the Utah Constitution, and from the observations made by the authors of
American Jurisprudence, that the only limitation that
the framers of the Utah Constitution saw fit to place
therein was for absconding debtors.
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It is recognized by the appellant that courts may
enforce their decrees with regards to the payment of
"alimony" and "support money," by contempt of court
proceedings. With this plaintiff makes no quarrel, and
in fact recognizes that the great weight of authority
holds this to be the law. However, under the facts of
the instant case, the trial court at the time of the rendi·
tion of the decree specifically stated that the $2,400.00
due to the respondent was "in lieu of alimony," and
therefore constituted nothing more than a money judg·
ment. As this is in fact a money judgment, the court
may not enforce under the guise of enforcing the pay·
ment of alimony, an order compelling the payment of
this money judgment. To do so flies in the teeth of
the constitutional prohibition of imprisonment for debt.
If this were the case, any money judgment rendered by
a court could be followed by an order of court directing
the judgment debtor to pay the judgment upon punish·
ment of contempt proceedings if he failed so to do. This
would in effect be imprisonment for debt if the debtor
did not pay the money judgment.
The law has provided the remedies of a judgment
creditor to collect a money judgment.
There is nothing to prevent the respondent in this
matter from pursuing her statutory rights to collect by
execution and garnishment. But to allow the court,
through the medium of contempt proceedings on the
theory that this is a domestic relations affair, to hold
the plaintiff in contempt of court and punishing him by
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placing him in jail is to go contrary to the constitutional
guarantees afforded the appellant.
Had the trial court wished to denominate this
$2,400.00 as "alimony," it could have done so not only
on the occasion of rendering the original Decree of Divorce, but at the time it rendered it~ subsequent modifications of that decree, and so far as that goes at the
time that it in effect modified the Decree of Divorce at
the time of the hearing in June of 1967, which gave
rise to the first appeal of this matter.
Alimony means money for the support of a divorced
wife. Anderson v. Anderson, 110 U. 300, 172 P.2d 132.
"\Vhen the court stated that the $2,400.00 was in "lieu of
mimony," it left nothing to conjecture that the $2,400.00
was for the wife's support.
A similar case as the one before the Court now
arose in California in the matter of Bradley v. Superior
Court (Supreme Court of California, 1957) 310 P.2d
634. In this case the parties had entered into a property
settlement agreement which was incorporated into the
Decree of Divorce. This called for periodic payments
by the husband to the wife of certain income which he
derived from mining properties. He refused to pay part
of these payments, and was held in contempt of court
and sentenced to jail. The husband asserted the provisions of the California Constitution, Article I, Section
14, which states:
"No person shall be imprisoned for debt in
any civil action, on mense or final process, unless
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in cases of fraud, nor in civil actions for torts
except in cases for willful injury to. person 0;
property; and no person shall be imprisoned for
a militia fine in time of peace."
The California court held that this provision of tge Constitution barred the imprisonment of the husband for
the nonpayment to the wife of this money on the theory
that the moneys due were not alimony or support money,
but was part of a property settlement and therefore
only enforceable as any normal money judgment. The
court reflected and said:
"Although 'as in the case of all constitutional
provisions designed to safeguard the liberties of
the person, every doubt should be resolved in
favor of the liberty of the citizen in the enforcement of the constitutional provision that no per·
son shall be imprisoned for debt.' (Citing Authority) A court may nevertheless punish by
imprisonment as a contempt the willful act of a
spouse (or former spouse) who, having the ability and opportunity to comply, deliberately re·
fuses to pay a valid order to pay alimony or an
allowance for the support of the other spouse (or
former other spouse). It is held that the obliga·
tion to make such payments is not a 'debt' within
the meaning of the constitutional guarante~
against imprisonment for debt. (Citing Cases)
"Where, however, the payments provided in
the property settlement agreement constitute a~
adjustment of property interests, rather than ah·
mony, support or maintenance, the more gen·
erally prevailing rule is stated to be that decrees
based thereon are not enforceable by contempt
proceedings."
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The court, in summarizing its position, stated:
"Inasmuch as it has been finally determined as
between the parties that the payments to be made
by petitioner to Francis in the present case con~titute 'an inseverable part of an integrated adjustment of all property relations of the parties
and not * * * a severable portion for alimony'
(citing cases) we conclude that enforcement of
such payments by contempt proceedings is forbidden by the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt."
Arizona had a like situation arise in the case of Stone
v. Stidham, Judge (1964) 96 Ariz 235, 393 P.2d 923,
wherein the Supreme Court of Arizona, in holding that
a writ of prohibition would lie against the Superior
Court to enforce a Decree of Divorce by contempt proceedings, stated:
"As in all cases of constitutional provisions,
designed to safeguard the liberty of the person,
every reasonable doubt should be resolved in
favor of such liberty."
"The term alimony does not contemplate a
settlement of property interest or general endowment of wealth. Like the alimentum in civil law
from which the word was derived, it has for its
sole object the provision of food, clothing, habitation and other necessities for support. We believe the better view is that the decree incorporating property settlement agreement cannot be
enforced by contempt proceedings."
This court further pointed out that the question of whether "alimony" or a "property settlement" was involved
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would not be determined by the Supreme Court, but
would be determined by the trial court or the court
of first instance. We submit that in the case now before this court the determination as to whether or not
this was in fact "alimony" or a "property settlement"
was decided by the court when it denominated the
moneys due to the defendant as moneys "in lieu of alimony," consequently this question has been laid to rest
by the trial court in the original Decree of Divorce.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT HAD INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE UPON WHICH TO
BASE A CONTEMPT OF COURT FINDING.
The appellant in this matter testified at the time
of the second hearing, and for that matter at the time
of the first hearing on the contempt of court citation,
that the reason he had not paid his wife was that she
had removed personal property belonging to him from
the family home, and refused to return it, and that he
was claiming an offset against the moneys he was
ordered to pay her "in lieu of alimony." (R-98, 99, 100).
Mr. Bott stated when he was asked:
"Why did you stop paying her."
ANSWER: "Because when she moved I
stayed home from work one time. I wanted to
see she got out of the house. She didn't p~ck
anything when I was there. I told her, knowin~
her as I did, I said 'Anything you take that dont
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belong to you I will have to charge it back to you.'
An.d that ~s what she did .. It took me quite a
w.hil~ to fmd out ever~thmg. That is why I
d1dn t pay her anything.
QUESTION: "You stopped paying because
you found out some of your things were missing?"
ANSWER: "Yes."
QUESTION: "And you told her you would
charge her up for anything she took that belonged to you t'
ANSWER: "Right" (R-98, 99, 100)
It is respectfully submitted that an offset is justification for nonpayment, and that therefore appellant
did not stand in contempt of the court's order.

POINT III
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.
The appellant in this matter was put on trial by
the District Court in June of 1967, for contempt of
court. This contempt of court conviction was overturned
by the Supreme Court of Utah in February of 1968.
Subsequently the appellant was tried a second time for
the same alleged contempt of court, the contempt of
court allegations covering the same period of time as
was adjudicated in the prior action. It is respectfully
submitted that pursuant to Article I, Section 12 of the
Constitution of Utah, the appellant may not be put
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twice in jeopardy for the same offense. State v. Whitman, 93 U. 557, 74 P.2d 696; State v. Sandman~ 4 U.2d
69, 286 P.2d 1060.
It will be argued to the court that the holding of
the Supreme Court in February of 1968 was to rule
that the court had no jurisdiction and therefore double
jeopardy will not attach. State v. Empey, 65 U. 609,
239 P. 25. It is respectfully submitted, however, that
if the court had no j~risdiction as to the contempt of
court charge, it also had no jurisdiction to proceed forward with the other matter~ which were incident to and
based upon the motion for contempt citation which
brought the parties before the court in the first instance.
Therefore, it is submitted that the court's ruling in
February of 1968 must stand for the proposition that
the court did have jurisdiction over the parties, and that
the Supreme Court's holding that the contempt of court
could not stand now invokes the doctrine of double
jeopardy.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court is faced
with a paradoxical situation of either the court had
jurisdiction over the partie~ in the first instance in June
of 1967, for all purposes or it did not have jurisdiction
over the parties for any purpose, and as it ruled pre·
viously that it did in fact have jurisdiction for the pur·
poses of settling and trying issues of property, then it
must have had jurisdiction over the person of the appel·
lant, although for procedural reasons the trial court's
judgment as to contempt of court was in error.
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POINT IV
THE TRIAL C 0 UR T COMMITTED
ERROR IN ENTERING AN INJUNCTIVE
ORDER AGAINST APPELLANT FROM PROSECUTING A CIVIL ACTION AGAINST
RESPONDENT.
The appellant instituted an action against respondent on March 27, 1968, in the District Court of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, entitled Celeste Bott v.
Mary Turner Bott, Civil No. 178623, said action being
for the recovery of a money judgment for the wrongful
conversion of personal property. The District Court,
without having examined the file, but taking judicial
notice of it, made a determination over the objection of
appellant that the matter therein contained had been
adjudicated in the matter presented to the Supreme
Court heretofore. It was pointed out to the court at
that time that this was not the fact, and that at the previous hearing in June of 1967, all of the property which
respondent had taken from the appellant's dwelling
house had not been adjudicated and that this law suit
sought to do just that.
The Constitution of Utah has guaranteed to the
appellant his right to the courts of this State, and the
right to prosecute an action before the courts of this
State.
Article I, Section 11, provides:
"All courts shall be open, and every person,
for any injury done to him in his person, property
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or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without denial
or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any
tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel, any
civil cause to which he is a party."
It is respectfully submitted that if in fact this ac·
tion filed by the appellant against respondent was barred
by the doctrine of res judicata, this would constitute an
affirmative defense which must be raised before the court
having jurisdiction over that matter by the filing of a
proper motion in that case. Rule 8 ( c) , Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, states:
"Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a pre·
ceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirma·
tively ***res judicata ***and arw other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court ex·
ceeded its jurisdiction in entering the injunctive order
in the divorce action against the appellant from contin·
uing further proceedings in his independent action filed
in Di~trict Court. It is submitted that the proper pro·
cedure should have been the filing of a motion to dismiss
based upon res judicata in the independent action, and
upon examination of the facts, the opportunity to file
affidavits and other evidence, the court could then have
determined whether or not the defense of res judicata
in that action was applicable.
The method employed by the District Court in en·
joining the appellant from proceeding forward with
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his independent action is contrary to Article I, Section
11, of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO A GREATER
TERM IN JAIL THAN THAT ORIGINALLY
ORDERED.
The appellant in June of 1967 was ordered committed to the County Jail for a period of five days. This
order was overturned by the Supreme Court. The trial
court, in hearing the same ca!)e on the same merits, with
the same evidence covering the same period of time,
increased the punishment of appellant three fold by
ordering him to be committed for a period of fifteen
days.

It is submitted that to increase the punishment of
appellant is to in effect deprive him of equal protections of the laws and of due process of law under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution
of the United States, as well as to the constitutional
guarantees under the Constitution of the State of Utah.
It is submitted that the law should be that an
accused should not be punished for his willingness to
challenge by an appeal to a higher court a lower court's
ruling, and if it is found that the lower court lacked
jurisdiction over the appellant in the first instance then
the appellant should not be punished by a greater imposition of fine or imprisonment upon a second trial.
~
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It is admitted by appellant that he can cite no
general law to the court that this is the law. But it
should be the law. To the contrary, it is admitted that
it has been held that where a person has been charged
with a crime, found guilty, and sentt:nced to imprison.
ment, and subsequently it is found that the court lacked
jurisdiction, that that person may be tried again for
that offense and greater or le~ser punishment may be
meted out, the theory being that if the court had no
jurisdiction anything that it did was void and therefore
the accused had no been injured or harmed in any way,
even though by reason of his availing himself of his
constitutional guarantees to a fair trial by appealing
to a higher court he runs the risk of greater punishment.
It is submitted that to allow the court to inflict
greater punishment upon one who had exercised his
constitutional guarantee~ is to in effect "chill the asser·
tion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who
chose to exercise them." United States v. Jackson
{1968) ______ U.S ....... , 20 L.ed 2d 138, 88 S.Ct .........
In this case, which arose under the constitutionality of
the Lindbergh kidnap law and the imposing of the death
penalty for demanding trial by jury, the Supreme Court
pointed out that a law which had the effect of inducing
defendants not to contest in "full measure" was patfully
unconstitutional. The appellant does not claim that the
Jackson case is relevant to the issues before this court,
except that it does point up that the law may not be
designed so that an accused will not avail himself of
his constitutional guarantees for fear of added punish·
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ment. In this respect it is submitted that the situation
is analogous where if one wishes to avail himself of his
constitutional guarantees to an appeal (Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution) he should not be put in
jeopardy of having additional punishment placed upon
him when it turns out in that appeal that the court
lacked jurisdiction to try him in the first instance and
that upon retrial, upon the same facts and circumstances,
punishment is meted out to him in excess of that which
was pronounced in the first instance.
Where the appellant was sentenced to five days in
jail upon his first trial, and upon the identical same
facts at a second trial, his punishment is increased three
fold, it would appear to the appellant that the court is
punishing him not for the contempt before the court
but for having taken an appeal to the Supreme Court
and having prevailed over the rulings of the District
Court.
It is one thing to state that a trial where there was
no jurisdiction is void and therefore the accused may be
tried a second time for the same offense, but is something else to say that the accused, if he seeks to avail
himself of his constitutional guarantees that he should
proceed on his own peril that if he should prevail he
may be punished twice, three or four-fold over that
which he had been sentenced to in the first trial, if he
should prevail and be tried a second time. The consequential effect of this rule of law is to effectively prevent an accused from availing himself of his constitu-
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I
!
I

tional guarantees for fear of the results of his act. In
the case at hand it is evident that the assertion of appe}.
lant's constitutional guarantees brought about an inflic·
tion of greater and harsher punishment for the attempted .
protection of those rights. The fact that the punislunent I
was increased for only ten days is immaterial as one ·
day in jail for one person may be equivalent to one year
in jail for another, and it is the deprivation of liberty I
which is the important factor, not the length of that j
deprivation.
SUMMARY
It i~ respectfully submitted to the court that the
appellant's constitutional rights have been violated in
this matter, and that this court should enter an order
reversing the trial court's rulings and further allow
appellant his constitutional right to his day in court.

Respectfully submitted,
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES
430 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
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